Abstract. Distributed denial-of-service attack is one of the greatest threats to the Internet today. One of the biggest di culties in defending against this attack is that attackers always use incorrect, or \spoofed" IP source addresses to disguise their true origin. In this paper, we present a packet marking algorithm which allows the victim to traceback the approximate origin of spoofed IP packets. The di erence between this proposal and previous proposals lies in two points. First, we develop three techniques to adjust the packet marking probability, which signicantly reduces the number of packets needed by the victim to reconstruct the attack path. Second, we give a detailed analysis of the vulnerabilities of probabilistic packet marking, and describe a version of our adjusted probabilistic packet marking scheme whose performance is not a ected by spoofed marking elds.
Introduction
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have become a major threat to the Internet 10] . At the same time, DDoS is extremely di cult to defend 6]. The reason lies in the fact that the attackers use incorrect (\spoofed") IP addresses in the attacking packets and therefore disguise the real origin of the attacks. This has made it very di cult or impossible to traceback the source of attacking IP packets.
A number of recent studies have approached the problem of IP packet traceback by Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) 15] 17]. It is assumed that the attacking packets are much more frequent than the normal packets. The main idea is to let every router mark packets probabilistically and let the victim reconstruct the attack path from the marked packet. All of the probabilistic marking algorithms try to overload the marking information into the 16 bit identi cation eld in the IP packet header, which is seldom used 5] 18]. A major issue with existing probabilistic marking schemes is that they use a xed marking probability, which means that there is a greatly reduced probability of getting packets from routers which are far away from the victim. Consequently the number of packets needed to reconstruct the attack path depends on the number of packets which are marked by the furthest router in the attack path. If we can increase the marking probability for the routers which are far away from the victim, then we need less packets to reconstruct the attack path.
A potential problem with packet marking is that the attacker can forge the marking eld. The authenticity of the marking eld is the biggest challenge for Probabilistic Packet Marking, which is discussed in 13]. Although Song and Perrig 17] have proposed a scheme for router authentication, it is still hard to implement and there are still some chances for the attacker to spoof the marking eld. However, if we can let the routers mark all the packets when they rst enter the network, then there is no way for the attacker to use the spoofed marking eld to decoy the victim.
In this paper, we make two contributions to the technique of Probabilistic Packet Marking. First, we have developed three techniques for adjusting the probability used by routers to mark packets, in order to reduce the number of packets needed by the victim to reconstruct the attack path. Second, we give a detailed analysis of the vulnerabilities of PPM, and describe a version of our adjusted probabilistic packet marking scheme whose performance is not a ected by spoofed marking elds. We demonstrate the bene ts of our approach with an analytical model as well as providing an experimental evaluation using simulated packet traces.
The paper is organized as follows. We present a brief background to this problem and highlight the main challenges of IP marking in Section 2. Section 3 introduces our Adjusted Probabilistic Marking Algorithm and shows a theoretical analysis. Simulation results of all these three techniques are provided in Section 4. From the analysis and simulation results, we can see that our Adjusted Probabilistic Marking Algorithm is more e cient and secure than the previous marking schemes. We discuss some practical issues in Section 5 and the related work is given in Section 6. Finally we conclude in Section 7.
Background on Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM)
Once an attack has been detected, an ideal response would be to block the attack tra c at its source. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to track IP tra c to its source. This is due to two features of the IP protocol. The rst feature is the ease with which IP source addresses can be forged. The second feature is the stateless nature of IP routing, where routers normally know only the next hop for forwarding a packet, rather than the complete end-to-end route taken by each packet. This design decision has given the Internet enormous e ciency and scalability, albeit at the cost of traceability. In order to address this limitation, Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) has been proposed to support IP traceability.
De nitions
The main idea of PPM is to let routers mark the packets with path information probabilistically and let the victim reconstruct the attack path using the marked packets.
Denial-of-service attacks are only e ective so long as they occupy the resources of the victim. As a result, most denial-of-service attacks are comprised of thousands or millions of packets. PPM is based on the assumption that when we mark each packet with only a small probability then the victim will receive su cient packets to reconstruct the attack path.
The network can be viewed as a directed graph G = (V; E) where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. V can be further partitioned into end systems (leaf nodes) and routers (internal nodes). The edges denote physical links between elements in V . Let S V denote the set of attackers and let t 2 V=S denote the victim. We will rst consider the case when jSj = 1 (single-source attack) and treat the distributed DoS attack case separately. We assume that routes are xed, and that the attack path A = (s; v 1 Each router marks a packet with probability p. When the router decides to mark a packet, it writes its own IP address into the edge eld and zero into the distance eld. Otherwise, if the distance eld is already zero, which means this packet has been marked by the previous router, it processes the packet as follows: (1) It combines its IP address and the existing value in the edge eld and writes the combined value into the edge eld. (2) It increases the distance value by 1. Thus, the edge value contains both information from the previous router and the current router. Finally if the router does not mark the packet, then it always increments the distance eld. This distance eld indicates the number of hops between the victim and the router that has marked the packet. The distance eld should be updated using saturating addition, meaning the distance eld is not allowed to wrap. When using this scheme, any packet written by the attacker will have a distance eld greater than or equal to the real attack path. In contrast, a packet which is marked by the router should have a distance eld which is less than the length of the path traversed from that router. 
Limitation of Previous PPM Schemes
Our aim is to minimize the time required to reconstruct the attack path. This depends on the time it takes to receive packets that have been marked by each router on the attack path. This in turn depends on the choice of the marking probability p. In this section, we model the performance of PPM in terms of p, and highlight the limitation of using a xed marking probability.
De nition 1 Let i denote the probability that packet arriving at the victim is lastly marked at node v i but nowhere after v i . For a uniform marking probability,
De nition 2 Let 0 denote the probability that a packet sent from the attacker reaches the victim without being marked at any of the routers. For a uniform marking probability, 0 = (1 ? p) d . In order to reconstruct the attack path as quickly as possible, the victim needs to receive a sample of packets marked by each router in the path. An unmarked packet provides no information to the victim. In fact, there is a risk that unmarked packets may contain misleading information that has been spoofed by the attacker. Consequently, we want as many packets to be marked as possible. This implies that p should be large, so that 0 is as small as possible. However, there is a penalty for making p too large. As p increases, there is a greater likelihood that packets marked by routers close to the source will be overwritten by routers close to the victim. Note that d : : : 2 1 , so 1 is the smallest value. This is worst for packets marked by the rst router after the source. So we need to choose p such that 0 is minimized and 1 is maximized. According to the coupon collecting problem 8], for each attack path with d routers (excluding the victim), and with marking probability p, the expected number of packets needed to reconstruct the attack path is N(d) = Our proposal is to reduce the total number of packets required N(d) by using a higher marking probability for routers close to the source. Ideally, we want to receive an equal number of packets marked by each router on the attack path, i.e. i = 1=d. In this case, the number of packets needed for reconstruction is
, which is greater than 2 for d 2. Our aim has been to develop a technique for adjusting the marking probability so that we can achieve the performance of N a (d).
Adjusted Probabilistic Packet Marking Schemes
According to the analysis in section 2, we propose that a router should adjust its packet marking probability based on its position in the attack path. However, the position of the router in the attack path is not known, since the position of the attacker is unknown. We need to estimate this distance based on the available information. In this section, we propose 3 di erent schemes for adjusting the marking probability based on the di erent distance measures Then we obtain the following equations: In order to implement this marking scheme, we need to know the distance measure d 1 . We propose to add an extra eld in the IP option eld. This eld can be used to record the number of hops (d 1 ) traversed by the packet. The default value for this eld is 0, and the router increases this value by 1 every time it forwards the packet. Every time the router gets the packet, it extracts the information d 1 from the option eld and marks the packet with probability 1=d 1 . In order to prevent the attacker from spoo ng this eld, we can use the encryption schemes which are discussed in 17].
Number of Hops Traversed Since the Packet was Last Marked (d 2 )
In the original Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) scheme 15], there are three parts in the marking eld. One part is called the distance eld (d 2 ), which is used to hold the distance information from last router to mark the packet to the current router. We denote d 2 = 0 for routers next to each other. Let each router mark the packet according to the formula:
. Since the larger the d 2 value, the higher the likelihood that it will be overwritten. Thus, we believe we should use a low marking probability for the packets with high d 2 value. Let us now illustrate the derivation of this formula by considering an example when the attack path length is 3.
The router marks the packet which has a distance value d 2 in the marking eld with a probability p 2 (d 2 ). We assume the routers mark each packet when it rst enters the network. So when the packet passes the rst router, the d 2 value will be set to 0. By analyzing all the possibilities of the d 2 value when the packets traverse the attack path, we can derive expression for i ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; d. Using these equations, we can nd optimal marking probabilities for 1 ; 2 ; 3 . However, the equations become more complicated as the path length increases, we consequently propose that the general marking probability should be p 2 
, which has been shown through experiments to have the best performance.
Since there are 5 bits in the marking eld to hold the information in the existing probabilistic marking scheme 15] 17], we only need to extract this information from the marking eld and mark the packet according to the formula p 2 (d 2 ) = 1 2(d2+1) .
Number of Hops from Current Router to Destination (d 3 )
If we can get the distance of the current router to the destination (d 3 ), we can mark each packet with a probability p 3 (d 3 ) = 1=(c+1?d 3 ) where c is a constant, and then we can receive packets marked by each router with a probability of 1=c. 
Summary
We can summarize each marking scheme in term of its performance and practicality.
Marking scheme 1: p 1 (d 1 ) = 1=d 1 can achieve the ideal marking performance. With this marking scheme, we can receive the packets marked by each router with equal probability for path length. Furthermore, every packet is marked under this scheme, and the attacker has no chance to spoof the marking eld. However, this scheme requires a special hop count eld and there is a risk that this eld can be spoofed by the attacker. In order to make this scheme work, we need a strong authentication scheme which can stop the attacker from spoo ng, e.g. 17].
Marking scheme 2:
uses the distance eld that is part of the packet marking scheme. This scheme can achieve a performance which is close to the optimal performance. In order to make this scheme work, we need to make sure the distance value in the marking eld is trustable. One possibility is to let the routers mark all the packets when they rst enter the network, then the attackers have no way to spoof the distance value. However, this is only practical if we control the ingress routers to our network, and thus is e ectively the same as a technique called ingress ltering 9].
Marking scheme 3: uses information from the routing protocol and can achieve better results than using the uniform marking probability. Since the information is from the routing protocol, it can not be manipulated by an attacker. So scheme 3 is the safest and most practical scheme.
Evaluation
Our aim is to compare the performance of each scheme to PPM. Our comparison is based on the number of packets needed to reconstruct an attack path for a range of simulated attacks.
Methodology
We simulate attacks from di erent distances using the methodology in 17]. The network topology is based on a real traceroute dataset obtained from Lucent Bell Labs 11]. In our simulation, we vary the attack path from 1 to 30 hops and conduct 1000 random trials at each path length value. We measured the number of packets required to reconstruct the attack path using our schemes, and compared this to the number of packets required by PPM 17] , where our implementation of PPM used a threshold of M=5 as de ned in 17]. We varied the uniform marking probability of PPM using the values p = 0:01; 0:04; and 0:1. Note that p = 0:04 is recommended as the optimum choice for PPM 15].
Results
The performance of schemes 1 to 3 are shown in Fig. 3 .
Schemes 1 and 2 perform the best, outperforming PPM for all values of p tested. However, these results assume that the distance eld has not been tampered with. Scheme 3 is the most practical, since its distance measure cannot be tampered with by the attacker.
Scheme 3 outperformed PPM with p = 0:01 and 0:04. Although PPM with p = 0:1 outperforms scheme 3 for small hop counts, scheme 3 performs far better when the attack path is large. Scheme 3 outperforms scheme 2 when path length is 20 or higher as shown in Fig. 3 . This is because as the path length increases, scheme 3 approaches optimum performance while scheme 2 cannot achieve the optimum performance as we discussed in Section 3.2. Furthermore, scheme 1 and scheme 3 converge when the path length equals 30 because c equals the path length, which makes p 3 (d 3 ) equivalent to p 1 (d 1 ).
Discussion

Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks
During a distributed denial-of-service attack, there are many attacking sources. We have found that the number of packets needed for reconstruction increases linearly with the number of attackers. So it will become very hard to verify all the attacking sources during a DDoS attack. Thus, our method to reduce the number of packets needed for reconstruction becomes extremely important to improve the reconstruction e ciency. 
Spoo ng the Marking Field
By spoo ng the marking eld, it is possible for attackers to make the attack appear as though it has come from a more distant source, e.g. a false source s f as shown in Fig. 4 . However, the attacker cannot change the marking of routers between it and the victim, e.g., v 1 to v 3 . Consequently, we can always reconstruct the path to the attacker, although we may also reconstruct a false sub-path at the start of the true path, e.g., v f1 to v f3 . If we are unable to authenticate the marking eld, then this false sub-path can a ect the performance of our rst two schemes. This is because distance measures d 1 and d 2 will be in ated by the false sub-path, thus decreasing the packet marking probability of routers in the true attack path.
However, our third scheme is una ected by the actions of the attacker. This is because d 3 is derived from information in the routing table of each router, and the destination eld. The attacker cannot fake the destination eld without defeating the purpose of the attack, and the attacker cannot manipulate the contents of the routing tables in the routers. Thus, the performance of our third scheme is secure against manipulation by the attacker. 6 Related Work Burch and Cheswick 3] propose a link-testing traceback technique. It infers the attack path by ooding the links with large bursts of tra c and observing how this perturbs the attack tra c. This scheme requires considerable knowledge of network topology and the ability to generate huge tra c in any network links. Mahajan et al. 12] provide a scheme in which routers learn a congestion signature to tell good tra c from bad tra c. The router then lters the bad tra c according to this signature. Furthermore, a pushback scheme is given to let the router ask its adjacent routers to lter the bad tra c at an earlier stage. This scheme is e ective for some types of DDoS attacks but it needs a narrow and accurate congestion signature to make sure the bad tra c is ltered while the good tra c is not a ected.
Bellovin 2] proposed an ICMP "traceback" scheme to let router generate ICMP packets to the destination containing the address of the router with a low probability. For a signi cant tra c ow, the destination can gradually reconstruct the route that was taken by the packets in the ow. ICMP packets are often treated with a low priority by routers to reduce the additional tra c, which undermines the e ectiveness of the scheme. This scheme is later extended by Wu et al . 20 ]. An alternative approach is to mark the packets themselves. Savage et al. 15] describe a scheme for routers to probabilistically mark packets. They propose using the identi cation eld of the IP header, which is normally used to control fragmentation. They point out that IP fragmentation is seldom used in practice. While their approach overcomes many of the limitations of the ICMP traceback proposal, there are some security problems when the attackers fake the marking eld. Song et al. 17] propose an enhanced scheme of probabilistic packet marking and also set up a scheme for router authentication. However, the authentication scheme is complex to implement. Dean et al. 7] propose an alternative marking scheme using noisy polynomial reconstruction. This scheme is backwards compatible, and incrementally deployable compared with the former proposals. Unfortunately their scheme is very vulnerable to fake markings put in the packets by the attackers. Furthermore, the number of packets needed to reconstruct the attack path is quadratic to the number of attackers. Snoeren et al. 16] propose a scheme to let routers store a record of every packet passing through the router, so that the router can then trace back the origin of the packet by using the history in the router. Although they describe a smart scheme to compress the storage, it is still a huge overhead for the router to implement this scheme, especially with the increasing network speed. Park and Lee 14] propose to put distributed lters in the routers and lter the packets according to the network topology. This scheme can stop the spoofed tra c at an early stage.
However, in order to place the lters e ectively, it needs to know the topology of the Internet and routing policy between Autonomous Systems, which is hard to achieve in the expanding Internet.
In summary, every marking scheme uses a xed marking probability which will result in a small number of packets marked by the more distant routers when all the packets arrive at the victim. In contrast, we have developed several schemes that solve this problem by adjusting the marking probability in each router, which signi cantly reduces the number of packets required to reconstruct the attack path. Furthermore, no one has set up a scheme to completely solve the security problem that the attacker can fake the marking eld. However, our third marking scheme does not use the contents of the marking eld to adjust the marking probability, and thus cannot be manipulated by the attacker while at the same time requiring fewer packets to trace the packet.
Conclusion
In this paper, we make the following two contributions to Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM). First, we developed three techniques to adjust the marking probability used by each router so that the victim receives packets marked by each router with equal probability. Scheme 1 is to let the IP packet carry a message to inform the router how far the packet has traveled. Scheme 2 is to use the distance value of the marking eld in the IP packet. Scheme 3 is to get the distance between the router and destination from the routing table. Both scheme 1 and scheme 2 need authentication to prevent the attacker from spoofing the required information. Scheme 3 is the most practical one and can improve the reconstruction e ciency compared with the optimal uniform marking probability (p = 0:04). By implementing this scheme, we can substantially reduce the number of packets needed to reconstruct the attack path in comparison to PPM. Our second contribution is that we give a detailed analysis of the vulnerability of PPM, and describe a version of our adjusted probabilistic packet marking scheme whose performance is not a ected by the vulnerability caused by spoofed marking elds.
